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CONTAMINATING THE VERDICT: 
THE PROBLEM OF JUROR MISCONDUCT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The jury has been hailed as one of the greatest attributes of democracy. 
Described as a "magistracy" by Alexis de Tocqueville two centuries ago,' the 
jury system affords ordinary citizens the opportunity to participate in the 
administration of j u~ t i ce .~  These citizens act as the conscience of the community 
and provide a bulwark against governmental oppression.3 The Constitution 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial, understood preeminently 
as the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury4 In two recent high-profile 
criminal trials in New York, the right to an impartial jury may have been 
compromised by questionable conduct by jurors. 
Following their convictions in federal court for conspiracy, obstruction of 
justice, and making false statements to government officials, Martha Stewart and 
co-defendant Peter Bacanovic alleged that one of the jurors deliberately 
concealed material information from his jury questionnaire and thereby 
prevented the defendants from exposing possible biases he may have harbored 
against them.5 Defendants Stewart and Bacanovic also sought a new trial on the 
ground that jurors considered information during their deliberations that was not 
received in e~idence .~  The defendants sought an evidentiary hearing to prove 
their allegations. 
In the highly-publicized "Tyco International" trial in New York County 
Supreme Court, in which former Tyco chief executives L. Dennis Kozlowski and 
Mark H. Swartz were charged with grand larceny and falsifying business 
records, the media reported that during tense and lengthy jury deliberations one 
of the jurors, upon returning to the courtroom, made a friendly hand gesture to 
the defendants that appeared to signal "o.K."~ The same juror earlier in the trial 
was admonished in a note from the court clerk for appearing to nod in approval 
when the defense had the floor.' After the juror's identity was disclosed in the 
t Professor of Law, Pace Law School; B.A., Princeton University; J.D., New York University 
School of Law. 
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (2000 ed.). 
2. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406 (1991). 
3. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (labeling jury as "conscience of  
community"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (characterizing jury as bulwark "to prevent 
oppression by the Government"). 
4. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976) (stating that criminal defendant's right to an 
impartial jury derives from both the Sixth Amendment and principles of due process); Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) ("Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an 
impartial jury free from outside influences."). 
5. United States v. Stewart, 3 17 F. Supp. 2d 426,428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
6. Id. 
7. David Carr & Adam Liptak, In Tyco Trial, an Apparent Gesture Has Many Meanings, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 29,2004, at C 1. 
8. Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Tyco Mistrial: The Overview: Tyco Trial Ended as a Juror Cites 
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media, she apparently was contacted by an outside source who questioned her 
motives, forcing the judge to declare a mi~t r ia l .~  The issue of this juror's 
possible prejudgment and bias was never subjected to a formal investigation and 
evidentiary proceeding. 
The problem of juror misconduct raised by the Stewart and Tyco cases is 
not unusual. Indeed, the issue of juror misconduct has been the subject of pre- 
trial skirmishing in the highly-publicized murder trial of Scott Peterson in 
california.1° Although a considerable body of scholarship on the jury system,'' 
jury selection techniques,12 and jury decision-making exists,13 the issue of juror 
misconduct has not been as closely or systematically studied. Cases and 
commentaries typically address isolated instances of aberrant and prejudicial 
conduct by jurors that arguably may have contaminated the trial. Rarely, 
however, do these discussions attempt to provide a coherent framework in which 
to analyze the diverse kinds of misconduct by jurors that may impair the 
integrity of the trial and the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury. Nor do these discussions examine in a comprehensive manner the 
available and appropriate legal responses to juror misconduct and the obstacles 
that may frustrate effective judicial inquiry. 
Part I1 describes the myriad ways in which misconduct by jurors can 
contaminate a trial and verdict and the ability of courts to remedy such 
misconduct. This Part examines the case law in which criminal defendants have 
challenged their convictions on the basis of juror misconduct. Defendants have 
claimed that jurors were influenced by external contacts with third parties,14 
exposed to extraneous, non-evidentiary information,15 engaged in contrived 
experiments and improper reenactments in the jury room,16 made dishonest and 
misleading statements during jury selection,17 engaged in conduct demonstratin 
bias and prejudgment,18 suffered from physical and mental impairments, 15 
engaged in pre-deliberation discussions of the evidence,20 and willfully violated 
Outside Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,2004, at Al .  
9. Jonathan D. Glater, The Tyco Mistrial: The Chief; N.Y. T m S ,  April 3,2004, at C5. 
10. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text. 
1 1. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY (1994); STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY (1 994). 
12. See, e.g., V. HALE STARR & h4ARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION (3d ed. 2001); JAMES J. 
GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION (2d ed. 1990). 
13. See, e.g., REED HASTIE, ET AL., INSIDE THE JUROR (1993); Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due 
Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital 
Trials, 23 LAW & HVM. BEHAV. 471 (1999); Bobby J. Calder, Chester A. Insko & Ben Yandell, The 
Relation of Cognitive and Memorial Processes to Persuasion in a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (1974); Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & Cathy Caldwell, The Effects of Inadmissible 
Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J .  APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973). 
14. See discussion infia Part 1I.A. 
15. See discussion infia Part 1I.B. 
16. See discussion infia Part 1I.C. 
17. See discussion infia Part 1I.D. 
18. See discussion infia Part 1I.E. 
19. See discussion infia Part 1I.F. 
20. See discussion infia Part 1I.G. 
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the trial court's legal  instruction^.^' 
Part I11 provides a framework to analyze the reasons for juror misconduct. 
This Part examines recent developments in criminal trial litigation that have 
encouraged jurors to take a more active role in the proceedings while at the same 
time protecting the juror's privacy and security. Given the easy accessibility of 
the Internet and the attempt by some jurors to thrust themselves into the public 
arena in highly publicized trials, there is a heightened danger that some jurors 
will misuse their power and contaminate the verdict. Moreover, strong public 
policies caution against probing verdicts and exposing juror mi~conduct .~~  
When a report of juror misconduct is made during the trial and before 
deliberations commence, the trial judge's ability to remedy the problem is 
greatest. When a report of juror misconduct is made during deliberations, as in 
the Tyco case, or after a verdict, as in the Stewart trial, overriding policy 
considerations may severely limit a trial court's ability to investigate and remedy 
the irregularity. As a consequence, the integrity of some verdicts may be 
undermined by a tainted jury. 
The Article concludes that the problem of juror misconduct is not 
insignificant, and that courts have had mixed success in dealing with the problem 
effectively. Although the quest for the perfect trial may be illusory, the ability of 
some jurors to contaminate the proceedings may deprive a criminal defendant of 
a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
11. JUROR BIAS AND MISCONDUCT 
Bias and misconduct by jurors have been demonstrated in several different 
ways. Instances of jurors violating their oath and engaging in improper conduct 
have produced a significant body of case law analyzing the juror's conduct, the 
nature and seriousness of the impropriety, the extent to which the conduct may 
have prejudiced the trial, and the appropriate methods available to the trial judge 
to remedy the problem. The kinds of misconduct include the following: contacts 
by third parties with jurors; exposure by jurors to extra-judicial non-evidentiary 
materials; efforts by jurors to conduct experiments and reenactments to test the 
evidence; untruthful statements by jurors during the voir dire; conduct by jurors 
that evinces bias and prejudgment; physical and mental impairment of jurors; 
pre-deliberation discussions by jurors; and efforts by jurors to repudiate the trial 
court's instructions on the law. 
It is fundamental that "the 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall 
come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial 
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of 
2 1. See discussion infa Part 1I.H. 
22. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
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counsel."23 Violations of these protections occur when third parties engage in 
private contacts or communications with jurors concerning matters pending 
before the jury. The leading case involving juror exposure to external influences 
is Remmer v. United There, the jury foreman was contacted by an 
unknown caller and offered a bribe to acquit the defendant. Without advising the 
defense, the judge asked the FBI to investigate the matter and concluded that the 
approach was harmless. The Supreme Court remanded for a hearing, holding 
that a bbpresumption of prejudice" should apply to any extra-judicial contact with 
a juror about the case. The Court stated: 
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering 
directly or indirectly, with a juror . . . about the matter pending before the 
jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not 
made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and 
directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the 
parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily 
upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the 
defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the 
defendant.25 
The Court in two subsequent jury-intrusion cases found inherent prejudice 
in the jury's exposure during the trial to external influences. In Turner v. 
~ o u i s i a n a , ~ ~  the Court reversed a murder conviction on the ground that the jury 
was contaminated by the continuing association throughout the trial between the 
jurors and two deputy sheriffs in charge of the jury, who were also key 
prosecution witnesses. In Parker v.   lad den,^^ the Court reversed another 
murder conviction because a court bailiff, who had supervised the jury, told 
several jurors privately that the defendant was guilty.28 
The trial court's authority to protect the jury from tampering is clear. When 
a court is informed during the trial that a juror has been contacted by an outside 
party or has engaged in conversations with a third party about the case, the court 
has a duty to investigate the matter.29 A court should begin the inquiry with "the 
presumption that the jury is impartial."30 However, if a colorable claim of 
extrinsic influence on impartiality has been made, a court may be obligated to 
23. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,472-73 (1965). 
24. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
25. Id. at 229. 
26. 379 U.S. 466 (1965). 
27. 385 U.S. 363 (1966). 
28. See also Agnew v. Leibach, 250 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating defendant denied right to 
fair trial before impartial juxy as a result of substantive testimony by court bailiff who had been in charge 
of jury through most of the trial); State v. Merricks, 831 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2002) (holding bailiffs 
improper communication with deliberating juxy is per se reversible error). 
29. United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739, 760 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating "no judge could adequately 
assess [the allegation of impropriety] without investigation and factual findings"); United States v. 
Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding "[olnce a defendant has made a sufficient showing 
that a juror may have been improperly influenced, the court must ascertain whether the juror was or was 
not tainted."). 
30. United States v. Sedigh, 658 F.2d 1010,1014 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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investigate the allegation even in the absence of a defense request.31 A court is 
given extremely broad discretion to determine the appropriate way to handle 
such a report.32 The more serious and credible the allegation, the more extensive 
investigation would be required.33 Frivolous or incredible allegations may be 
disposed of summarily. A pre-verdict inquiry generally is preferred.34 
However, there are problems with a formal, pre-verdict inquiry. When the 
subject matter of the contact involves a threat or a bribe, presumably by a person 
associated with the defendant, questioning jurors before the verdict may so focus 
their attention on the defendant's conduct that a jury otherwise capable of 
delivering an impartial verdict may no longer be able to do so.35 
When the allegation of an improper contact is made after the verdict, 
different considerations come into play. Courts are naturally reluctant "to 'haul 
jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to robe for potential 
instances of bias, misconduct, or extraneous influences. "" Courts also are 
justifiably concerned that post-verdict inquiries may inhibit jury-room 
discussions, deter jurors from returning an unpopular verdict, subject jurors to 
harassment, or burden courts with frivolous and time-consuming applications.37 
Moreover, b creating uncertainty in jury verdicts, the policy of finality is 
jeopardized.)' Finally, the inadmissibility of juror testimony to impeach a 
verdict renders a factual determination of jury taint much more difficult.39 
31. State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288, 1302 (Conn. 1995) (stating that the "circumstances required a 
sua sponte preliminary inquiry by the trial court"). 
32. United States v. Ortiz-Anigoitia, 996 F.2d 436,443 (1st Cir. 1993). 
[I]n light of the infinite variety of situations in which juror misconduct might be discerned and 
the need to protect jurors and the jury process from undue imposition, the trial judge is vested 
with the discretion to fashion an appropriate and responsible procedure to determine whether 
misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial. 
Id. See also United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that the trial court 
has broad discretion over the methodology of inquiries into third party contacts with jurors). 
33. United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding district court abused its 
discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into serious allegations of extraneous 
influences on jury). 
34. Smith, 26 F.3d at 759. 
35. United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1301 (2d Cir. 1991). 
36. United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting U.S. v. Moon, 718 F.2d 
1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)) (refusing to allow defendant to investigate jurors merely to conduct fishing 
expedition). 
37. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,120-21 (1987). 
38. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,267-68 (1915) ("[Llet it once be established that verdicts 
solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside . . . ."). 
39. See FED. R. E W .  606(b). Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the "anti- 
impeachment rule," states: 
Upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter 
or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything 
upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent or to dissent 
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
Id. 
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Nevertheless, some investigation may be required, and an evidentiary hearing 
may be necessary. Here again, a trial court is vested with extremely broad 
discretion to fashion an appropriate and responsible procedure to determine 
whether misconduct actually occurred and whether it was prejudicial.40 
The continuing viability of Remmer's "presumption of prejudice" test when 
jurors have been subjected to extra-judicial contacts has been questioned. The 
Supreme Court has suggested that the presumption should not be invoked 
automatically but should be reserved for instances involving very serious 
intrusi0ns.4~ Some lower courts have questioned whether the presumption still 
exists in light of intervening Supreme Court de~isions.4~ Moreover, even courts 
that continue to apply the presumption do so inconsistently.43 There is plainly a 
strong justification for applying a presumption in cases of serious jury 
tampering.44 Such conduct is pernicious, likely to poison the integrity of the 
process, and damaging to the appearance that juries behave fairly and 
impartially. Requiring the government to disprove prejudice in such cases is 
readily understandable. By the same token, applying an inflexible presumption 
in cases of technical, trivial, and arguably insignificant although improper 
40. United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiiuy hearing into allegations of extraneous influences 
on jury); United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding juror's mid-trial request to be 
excused from service because of fears for his safety and his revelation that he discussed those fears with 
fellow jurors should have prompted the trial court to do more than merely discharge juror; the trial court 
should have conducted an inquiry into the possible effect of juror's remarks on other jurors). 
41. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993). "There may be cases where an intrusion 
should be presumed prejudicial." Id. See also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (stating ex parte 
contact between trial court and juror reviewed for actual prejudice); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,2 17 
(1982) ("[Dlue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially 
compromising situation."). 
42. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 @.C. Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the 
Remmer test has been reconfigured by subsequent Supreme Court decisions); United States v. Madrid, 
842 U.S. 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that post-Remmer Supreme Court decisions "firmly 
establish that a defendant must demonstrate 'actual prejudice' resulting from an ex parte contact to 
receive a new trial"); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532-33 (6th Cir. 1984) (asserting that 
presumption of prejudice has been abrogated by recent Supreme Court decisions and that burden is now 
on the defendant to demonstrate prejudice). But see United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (I lth 
Cir. 1994) ("As a matter of established law, the burden of proving prejudice does not lie with the 
defendant because prejudice is presumed the moment the defendant establishes that 'extrinsic contact 
with the jury in fact occurred."'). 
43. Compare United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that although juror 
misconduct or other improper juror contacts may require evidence of prejudice to gain relief, jury 
tampering is a much more serious intrusion into the jury's processes and still gives rise to a presumption 
of prejudice) with United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (opining that jury tampering 
should not necessarily be presumed prejudicial; the trial court must first assess the severity of the 
suspected intrusion, and only when the court determines that prejudice is likely should the government 
be required to prove its absence). See also United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 377 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(requiring the trial court to conduct a Remmer hearing only when alleged contact presents "a likelihood 
of affecting verdict;" courts should not presume that contact was prejudicial, and the defendant has the 
burden to show that unauthorized contact created actual juror bias). 
44. United States v. Smith, 26 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1994) (alleging that juror was threatened); United 
States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that friends told juror that "people like [the 
defendant] should be incarcerated"); United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1989) (alleging 
that the judge and federal marshal pressured the jury to reach a verdict); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 
740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988) (relating that owner of diner told jurors "they ought to fry the son of a bitch"); 
Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) (alleging that deputy sheriff told jurors that the 
defendant has a criminal record). 
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transgressions, may be an excessive and unjustifiable response.45 
If a court does invoke a presumption of prejudice when evidence of an 
outside contact with a juror has been shown, then the prosecution bears the 
ultimate burden of disproving prejudice.46 A court should consider several 
factors in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, including the 
nature and seriousness of the communication, whether the extrinsic 
communication was shared with other members of the jury, the manner in which 
it was discussed, the length of time it was available to the jury, whether the 
communication related to factual evidence not developed at the trial, whether it 
was disseminated before the verdict or during deliberations, and whether the 
communication was reasonably likely to influence the verdict, especially in light 
of the strength of the government's case.47 The ultimate legal question for the 
court is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the extra-judicial contact 
could have affected the verdict.48 If a court chooses not to apply a presumption 
of prejudice, then the court would evaluate the severity of the suspected 
intrusion, and only if the court determines that prejudice is likely would the 
government be required to prove its absence. 49 
A jury's exposure to extraneous information not presented as evidence in 
the courtroom can contaminate a verdict as readily as third-party  contact^.^' 
When such extrinsic information relates to a material issue in the trial, it can 
seriously impair a defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. Such 
information may reveal a defendant's ylt,51 prior criminal record,52 prior 
rni~conduct,~~ reputation for violenceY5 or a co-defendant's guilty plea.55 
45. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497 (stating "isolated" and "trivial" remarks demonstrated no 
"likelihood of prejudice" to justify assigning to government burden of proving harmlessness); United 
States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) ("We do not find that the circumstances of this 
case are close to being sufficiently aggravated to give rise to a presumption of prejudice."). 
46. Remrner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,229 (1954) (stating that the "burden rests heavily upon 
government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was 
harmless to the defendant"). 
47. United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 1995). 
48. United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Bayramoglu v. 
Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the equivalent of asking whether it can be 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that extra-judicial information did not contribute to verdict). 
49. See United States v. Martha Stewart, 3 17 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing as "idle 
gossip" a post-trial allegation that a juror during the trial received an anonymous telephone call 
containing derogatory information about Ms. Stewart, including information that Ms. Stewart possessed 
a very expensive handbag and the high hourly rates she paid her lawyers); see also United States v. 
Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998). 
50. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
51. United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that the case agent sitting at 
the prosecutor's table gestured toward the defendant when the prosecution's witness was asked to 
identify the person who stole the money). 
52. Je f i es  v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993); Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
53. United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 1995). 
54. Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1995). 
55. See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 
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Extrinsic information may come from a juror's personal knowledge,56 the jury's 
exposure to mid-trial ~ b l i c i t y , ~ ~  or from official documents and records made 
available to the jury$ The distinction between intrusions from extra-judicial 
contacts by third parties and exposure to extra-judicial information ordinarily has 
no bearing in determining whether the verdict was tainted by the event.59 The 
nature of extra-judicial information to which jurors have been exposed ranges 
from the very prejudicial to the insignificant. Exposures to external information 
that required a new trial included knowledge by one juror that was imparted to 
other jurors that the federal defendant had been convicted in state court for the 
same conduct;60 jurors' pre-existing knowledge of specific facts surrounding the 
crime and defendant's connection to it;61 an opinion by two jurors who had 
professional expertise in medicine on whether defendant's explanation for blood 
loss was credible;62 and the trial court's acceding to the jury's request, after the 
close of the evidence and during deliberations, to return to the courtroom to 
observe the defendant's ears, which were covered during the trial for Spanish 
translation through headphones.63 
Jurors also may acquire extraneous information relating to the facts of the 
case or the meaning of certain legal principles by engaging in extra-judicial 
research. A juror's acquisition of extra-judicial, non-evidentiary knowledge, 
particularly when the juror disseminates the information to the other jurors, may 
produce sufficient prejudice to require reversal. Moreover, the ready 
accessibility of the Internet makes such research not only easy, quick, and 
extremely informative, but also potentially highly prejudicial. Examples of 
jurors engaging in extrinsic research include consulting an encyclopedia to 
confum that a blood type is rare,@ researching law treatises to ascertain the 
705 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 1324 @. Minn. 1996). 
56. Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that a juror told other jurors 
that the defendant and his brothers broke into people's homes); Lawson, 60 F.3d at 610 (relating that a 
juror told other jurors the defendant had a reputation for violence); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 
865,866 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the juror told other jurors the defendant had been in trouble before). 
57. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that a magazine article about the 
defendant's attorney circulated in the jury room); United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 
1985) (stating that a magazine article about material related to the case was left in jury room); United 
States v. Aburahmah, 827 F. Supp. 612 (D. Ariz. 1993) (relating that a newspaper was left in the jury 
room); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 769 F. Supp. 1564 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that a newspaper 
was left in the jury room): Keen v. State, 639 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1994) (noting a magazine article in the jury 
room). 
58. United States v. Harber, 53 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995) (documenting a case where a copy of the 
case agent's report containing an opinion that the defendant was guilty had been left in the jury room); 
United States v. Luffred, 91 1 F.2d 101 1 (5th Cir. 1990) (relaying the situation where a government chart 
that was not in evidence was brought into the jury room); Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that the police report inadvertently was left in the jury room); United States v. Vasquez, 597 
F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the court file was inadvertently left in the jury room); Osborne v. 
United States, 351 F.2d 11 1 (8th Cir. 1965) (documenting a situation where the grand jury transcript 
depicting defendant's criminal history was made available to jury). 
59. JefEies v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). 
60. United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1998). 
61. Titus v. State, 963 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1998). 
62. People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000). 
63. United States v. Santana, 175 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999). 
64. Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851,853 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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meaning of legal concepts such as or the possible penalties for first 
and second degree murder,66 and gaining access to a dictionary to define 
prominent terms associated with the case, such as "ente rise" in a RICO 
prosecution,67 or "callous" and "wanton" in a homicide trial? People v. Wadle 
is a recent example of a jury verdict being tainted by a juror's unauthorized use 
of the Internet to acquire information relevant to the case.69 The defendant was 
charged with the shaking death of her 4-month-old ~ te~-grandchi ld .~~  The 
prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was taking the anti-depressant 
Paxil for stress and holiday season depression.71 During deliberations, a juror 
who had training as an emergency medical technician told the other jurors that 
Paxil was a "very strong drug" that was "used for people who are antisocial, 
violent, or suicidal."72 Despite the trial judge's denial of the jury's request to 
consult a pharmacological reference, a juror downloaded from the Internet a 
description of Paxil and the next day read the description to the jury. The 
description stated that the drug is used to treat "mental depression, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder, panic disorder, and social anxiety disorder."73 
Following a conviction, and learning of the jury's action, the trial court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the juror's use of the 
Internet constituted misconduct, but denied the defendant's motion for a new 
trial on the ground that there was no reasonable possibility that the extraneous 
information affected the verdict.74 The appellate court reversed, finding that the 
juror's use of the Internet, in direct violation of the trial judge's order, tainted the 
verdict.75 The court noted that given the sharp conflict in the testimony, the jury 
may have used the specialized and complex terminology from the Internet to 
assess the defendant's motive, state of mind, and credibility as a witness.76 The 
fact that the defendant was taking an anti-depressant, anti-anxiety medication for 
panic attacks may have been a determining factor in the jury's verdict.77 
Recognizing the problems created by the availability and widespread use of the 
Internet, the court instructed trial judges to emphasize to jurors that they "should 
not consult the Internet or any other extraneous materials" during the trial and 
 deliberation^.^^ 
As in the previous section, the court's determination of whether a juror's 
65. Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1987). 
66. Bayramoglu v. Estelle, 806 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1986). 
67. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
68. United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566,567 (8th Cir. 1988). 
69. 77 P.3d 764 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003), a f d ,  97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004). 
70. See id. at 765-66. 
7 1. Id. at 769-70. 
72. Id. at 769. 
73. Id. at 770. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 771. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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exposure to extraneous information may have tainted the verdict may require the 
use of a presumption of prejudice. A jury is presumed to be impartial.79 
However, when a sufficient showing is made that jurors have been exposed to 
extrinsic evidence, some courts will apply a presumption of prejudice, 
particularly when the extraneous information is of a very serious nature." 
Exposure to mid-trial publicity ordinarily is not considered sufficiently serious to 
require a court to presume prejudice.81 Nevertheless, if a court learns during the 
trial that jurors have been exposed to extraneous information about the trial, the 
court is required to conduct an appropriate inquiry, including an evidentiary 
hearing when necessary, to determine whether jurors were tainted by the 
exposure. 82 
C. EXPERIMENTS AND REENACTMENTS 
Jurors do not live in capsules. It is not expected that jurors should leave 
their common sense and cognitive functions at the door before entering the jury 
room. Nor is it expected that jurors should not apply their own knowledge, 
experience, and perceptions acquired in the everyday affairs of life to reach a 
verdict.83 However, a juror's procurement of new knowledge gained throu h 
5 4  
extra-judicial means may contaminate the deliberations and upset the verdict. 
The line between the two sources of information, needless to say, is not easily 
drawn. 
Courts are much more likely to recognize as appropriate a juror's 
knowledge gained from ordinary life experiences. For example, there is no 
impediment to a juror's knowledge gained from personal experience that a 
particular neighborhood is busy all night,85 drawing a map to show the location 
of buildings in a certain area,86 or describing a person's ability to make an 
accurate identification from a moving a u t ~ m o b i l e . ~ ~  These mental processes 
79. United States v. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d 1175, 1179 (5th Cu. 1983). 
80. United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Harber, 53 F.3d 
236,240 (9th Cir. 1995). 
81. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cu. 1996). "The few decisions in the 
courts of appeals that explicitly address juror exposure to mid-trial publicity have not applied the 
Rernrner presumption." Id. 
82. See United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1995); Waldorfv. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 
709-10 (3d Cir. 1993); State v. R.D., 785 A.2d 450,454-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
83. Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cu. 1994) (stating that a juror's "observation 
concerning the life of this community is part of the fund of ordinary experience that jurors may bring to 
the jury room and may rely upon"); People v. Szymanski, 589 N.E.2d 148, 152 (111. App. Ct. 1992) 
("[Tlhe law is well established that the jury has a right to consider the evidence in light of its own 
knowledge and observations in the affairs of life."); People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. 1979). 
"It is not expected that their selection as jurors should cripple their cognitive functions." Brown, 399 
N.E.2d at 53. 
84. A jury's critical analysis of evidence by ordinary means, even if not specifically approved by 
the court, is not necessarily improper. See United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that the use of a magnifying glass to examine photographic evidence is no different than using 
corrective eyeglasses). 
85. Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1994). 
86. People v. Syzrnanski, 589N.E.2d 148, 151 (111. App. Ct. 1992). 
87. People v. Cooper, 157 Cal. Rptr. 348,353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
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involve no more than the application of everyday observations and common 
sense to the factual issues in the trial. By the same token, the application by a 
juror, trained as a professional engineer, of his technical knowledge of physics to 
refute an opinion offered by a defense witness also was permissible.88 
By contrast, a juror's deliberately contrived investigation or experiment that 
relates to a material issue in the trial ordinarily undermines the integrity of the 
verdict. Acquiring relevant factual information in this manner puts the jury in 
possession of evidence not presented at the trial and not subjected to 
confrontation and cross-examination. Examples of improper juror 
experimentation include a juror who placed a heavy load in the trunk of his car 
as a conscious way to determine whether such weight in a trunk would have 
imparted knowledge to the defendant of the presence of drugs,89 a juror's 
experiment in attempting to fire a wea on while holding it in a position 
consistent with the defendant's account,g8clocking how long it would take to 
drive a certain di~tance,~'  and simulating a witness's use of binoculars to 
determine whether the witness could possibly have seen what he claimed he 
saw.92 The same principle that forbids jurors from acquiring specialized 
knowledge through extra-judicial means also accounts for the prohibition against 
jurors making unauthorized visits to locations described in the trial testimony.93 
The distinction between the proper use of everyday acquired knowledge to 
evaluate the evidence and the improper procurement of specialized knowled e to 
test the evidence often may be tenuous. For example, in People v. Brown?' the 
defendant was convicted by a New York jury of robbery for having been the 
driver of the escape car.95 A police officer, the only prosecution witness to 
identify the defendant, testified that while driving with two other officers in an 
unmarked General Motors van, he s otted a car moving slowly with three 86 occupants looking into store windows. When the car stopped at a red light, the 
van pulled up alongside the driver's side and the officer, who was seated in the 
second seat of the van, looked at the driver for 37 seconds.97 The police van 
followed the car and ultimately engaged in a running gun battle, which ended 
when the escape car rammed another vehicle and all three suspects escaped on 
foot.98 The defendant was arrested later that evening after the police traced the 
88. State v. Mann, 11 P.3d 564,573 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000). 
89. United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 8 18,820-2 1 (9th Cir. 199 1). 
90. Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499,503-06 (9th Cir. 1987). 
91. State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 1995). 
92. People v. Castro, 229 Cal. Rptr. 280,281-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
93. United States v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Posner, 
644 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (S.D. Fla. 1986), a r d  sub nom. United States v. Scharrer, 828 F.2d 772 ( I  lth 
Cir. 1987); People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 658-59 (Ill. 1978); People v. Crimmins, 258 N.E.2d 708, 
709-10 (N.Y. 1970). See also Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding 
unauthorized visit improper but harmless). 
94. 399 N.E.2d 51,53-54 (N.Y. 1979). 
95. Id. at 52. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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escape car to him.99 
One of the key issues at trial was the officer's opportunity to accurately 
observe the defendant from his position in the van. After the verdict, it was 
learned that one of the jurors had conducted a test from her Volkswagen van, 
after which she told the other jurors that it was possible to see the face of a driver 
of an adjacent car.''' Since this test supported the accuracy of the officer's 
testimony, the defendant claimed that it constituted misconduct requiring a new 
trial. At a hearing on the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, the juror 
acknowledged conducting the test but said it was not pre-planned, had not been 
conducted at the scene of the incident, and was prompted by her curiosity to see 
if such identification was possible.101 The trial court found no irregularity in the 
juror's conduct, believing that the juror's test was merely an application of 
everyday perceptions and common sense to issues at the trial; the intermediate 
appellate court affirmed.lo2 The court of appeals reversed the con~ic t ion . '~~  
Acknowledging that jurors are allowed to apply their education, experience, and 
cognitive functions to sift the evidence and reach a verdict, the court concluded 
that the juror's conduct was not an application of everyday experience but rather 
a "conscious, contrived e~~erimentat ion." '~~ Importantly, the juror's test 
bolstered an issue that was critical to the prosecution's theory and, by 
communicating her conclusion to the other jurors, created a substantial risk that 
the verdict was tainted by the jury's use of the extrinsic experiment. 
It is likely that the juror's test would have been acceptable if the juror had 
simply represented to the other jurors that her experience with vans confirmed 
the accuracy of the officer's observation. It is also likely that the jury would 
have been able to conduct an experiment in the jury room, for example, by 
placing a chair on a table to simulate the angle of observation by the officer. 
Moreover, it is commonly understood that jurors are typically much more 
observant of everyday events when a similar issue arises in a trial and are more 
likely to engage in unplanned observations or simulations similar to the events 
depicted at trial. ' O5 
Reenactments in the jury room based on the jury's recollection of the 
testimony are usually allowed as an application of the jury's common sense and 
deductive reasoning to determine the truth of the facts in dispute.lo6 The 
reenactments by jurors portrayed in the classic film Twelve Angry   en"^ 
illustrate the use of critical analysis by jurors of the evidence based on their 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. People v. Brown, 407 N.Y.S.2d 91 1,914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
103. Brown, 399 N.E.2d at 55. 
104. Id. at 53. 
105. Id. at 54-55 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). 
106. United States v. Hephner, 410 F.2d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Balisok, 866 P.2d 631, 
633 (Wash. 1994) (quoting People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)). 
107. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGWnited Artists 1957). 
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knowledge and experience. One of the reenactments in the film involved a juror 
who, based on his experience as an adolescent familiar with the use of a 
switchblade knife, described the manner in which a switchblade knife ordinarily 
would be opened and thrust outward, thereby contradicting a key theory of the 
prosecution. Another reenactment in the film portrayed a juror simulating the 
time it would take for an elderly, crippled witness to go from his bedroom to the 
door of his apartment in order to determine whether the witness's estimate of the 
time it took to travel the distance - a critical issue in the trial - was accurate and 
believable. 
However, if the reenactment is not merely a more critical analysis of the 
evidence but puts the jury in possession of extraneous information that might be 
based on flawed and irrelevant conclusions, the reenactment may be found 
improper. For example, a juror enga ed in improper conduct by biting another 
juror to observe the resulting bruises.'~~ Also improper was a reenactment by a 
juror with machinery that had been admitted into evidence but was operated 
under conditions wholly unlike the conditions relevant to the charges.Io9 
The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause guarantee a defendant 
the right to an unbiased jury.ll0 The voir dire of prospective jurors serves to 
protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury "by exposing possible biases, both 
known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. "l l '  Bias of prospective 
jurors may be actual or implied.'12 Actual bias is a bias in fact; implied bias is a 
bias that is presumed as a matter of law."3 Actual bias may be established by 
showing that a juror failed to respond honestly to questions during voir dire and 
that a truthful response "would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause."' l4 As the Supreme Court observed, "[tlhe necessity of truthhl answers 
by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obviou~.""~ Bias 
also may be presumed or imputed to a juror by establishing from the 
circumstances that the juror is unable to exercise inde endent and impartial 
judgrnent.'I6 Proof of juror bias necessitates a new trial. 18 
There is a presumption that prospective jurors answer the voir dire 
108. Miller v. Harvey, 566 F.2d 879,881 (4th Cir. 1977). 
109. United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153,158 (4th Cir. 1961). 
1 10. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,595 n.6 (1 976). 
11 1. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,554 (1984). 
112. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134 (1936). 
113. Id. 
114. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at 556. Challenges for cause require the 
challenging party to articulate clearly on the record the precise reason for challenging a prospective juror 
that demonstrates as a matter of law that the juror is not qualified to serve. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 
U.S. 648, 652 n.3 (1987). 
1 15. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at 554. 
116. Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964). 
117. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
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questions There is also a presumption that a juror's failure to 
respond honestly during voir dire is indicative of bias.' l9 Prospective jurors for 
various reasons may give deliberately untruthkl answers.120 Deliberate 
concealment or misleading responses also may impair a party's right to 
meaningfully exercise challen es to the juror's ability to serve and ordinarily 
provide a basis for relief. 14 However, only intentionally dishonest or 
misleading responses provide a basis for relief.122 Forgetfulness or honest 
mistakes, by contrast, do not establish dishonesty and are not grounds for a new 
trial.123 As the Supreme Court noted, "[tlhe motives for concealing information 
may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be 
said to affect the fairness of a 
Determining whether a juror gave willhlly false answers is a factual issue 
for the court to determine. Thus, in a prosecution of a defendant for sexual 
offenses against members of his family, a juror was found not to have been 
dishonest during voir dire examination when she denied being involved in a 
"similar incident," although she had been the victim of a date rape several years 
e ~ 1 i e r . l ~ ~  By contrast, a juror's failure to disclose that she had been married to 
the prosecution's lead-off witness and that she had once been represented in a 
lawsuit by the trial prosecutor was dishonest and required an evidentiary hearing 
to enable the defendant to prove actual bias.126 Similarly, a juror's failure to 
reveal that her brother-in-law was a government attorney, when asked that 
specific question during voir dire, was arguably dishonest, particularly in 
circumstances strongly suggesting that the juror wanted to sit on the case.127 
Also dishonest and not simp1 inadvertent were responses denying any 
acquaintance with the defendant," denying any experience with explosives,129 
denying being the victim of domestic physical abuse,I3O and concealing 
familiarity with the case or having discussed the case with others.131 
The above principles were applied in United States v. Martha ~ t e w a r t , ' ~ ~  
118. United States v. Droge, 961 F.2d 1030, 1036 (2d Cir. 1992). 
119. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,904 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
120. United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 
1519 (1 1th Cir. 1984). 
121. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2000); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1988); 
McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1981). 
122. Gonzalez v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978,984 (10th Cir. 1996). 
123. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Edmond, 
43 F.3d 472,474 (9th Cir. 1994). 
124. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,556 (1984). 
125. Gonzalez, 99 F.3d 978. 
126. Williams, 529 U.S. at 420-21. 
127. United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 1989). 
128. United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 15 19, 1522 (1 lth Cir. 1984). 
129. United States v. St. Clair, 855 F.2d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1988). 
130. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1 150, 1 153 (10th Cir. 1991). 
131. In re Hitchings, 860 P.2d 466 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
132. 317 F. Supp. 2d. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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where the defendants sought a new trial, claiming that a juror deliberately 
concealed material information in his jury questionnaire and that his conduct 
"betray ed a pattern of deliberate omissions that concealed his bias against 
them."lk3 'The defendants claimed that the juror concealed a prior arrest and 
arraignment, that he and his family had been sued in court, that his son had been 
convicted of attempted robbery, that the juror had been accused of 
embezzlement, and that he was terminated from his job for wrongdoing. After 
carefully examining each of the claims, the trial court concluded that although 
two of the juror's answers were dishonest, the defendants did not show that 
truthful answers would have provided the basis for a challenge for cause based 
on a finding of bias. For example, even if the juror had deliberately concealed 
his arrest, the fact of his arrest would have provided no basis for a challenge for 
cause because it would not have revealed a bias sufficient to support such a 
~ h a 1 l e n ~ e . l ~ ~  By the same token, the failure to disclose his son's conviction 
would not justifL an inference that the juror would be biased against the 
 defendant^.'^^ In denying an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the 
juror's "lack of candor," however troubling, "in the absence of evidence of bias, 
[did] not undermine the fairness of defendants' trial. ,7136 
E. BIAS AND PREJUDGMENT 
Apart from showing that a juror gave dishonest or misleading answers 
during voir dire, a party still may be entitled to relief by demonstrating that a 
juror harbors an actual bias or that a bias may be imputed to the juror based on 
the juror's conduct and the syrounding context and circ~rnstances. '~~ As noted 
above, the ability to substantiate a claim of bias may be hampered by the rule 
against impeaching a juror's verdict,138 which would probably disallow 
testimony by jurors concerning negative or inappropriate comments made by a 
juror during de1iberati0ns.l~~ In Smith v. ~ h i l l i ~ s , ' ~ ~  the Supreme Court 
suggested that only proof of actual bias could be the basis for a new trial.141 The 
Court stated: "This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror 
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual 
bias."14 In Smith, a juror submitted during the trial an application for 
133. Id. at 438. 
134. Id. at 439. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 443. 
137. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
138. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. 
139. See United States v. Bolling, 900 F.2d 926, 935 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that ambiguous 
testimony from non-jurors that one juror stated, "It's all bullshit," was not capable of corroboration by 
testimony of jurors). 
140. 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 215. As authority for this principle the Court cited Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 
(1981); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); and Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 
(1 950). 
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employment as an investigator with the same district attorney's office that was 
prosecuting the case.143 At a post-trial hearing on whether to grant a new trial 
for juror bias, the trial court found that the letter "was indeed an indiscretion" but 
that the letter did not demonstrate bias or prejudgment.144 Thereafter, on a 
petition for habeas corpus, the federal district court granted the writ by imputing 
bias to the juror as a matter of due process, finding that "the average man in [the 
juror's] position would believe that the verdict of the jury would directly affect 
the evaluation of his job application."145 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit However, the Supreme Court rejected the conclusion that 
bias should be imputed to this juror and made the following observation: 
[Dlue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been 
placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few 
trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror 
impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial 
judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from 
every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due 
process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the 
evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they 
happen. 147 
Under Smith, proof of actual bias ordinarily must be demonstrated to obtain 
relief.148 Nor did the Court believe that proof of an actual bias would be 
difficult to show. As the Court observed, "one who is trying as an honest man to 
live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an 
unbiased mind in a certain matter. However, the Court's confidence that a 
juror can be trusted to acknowledge an actual bias may be questioned.150 
Apart from proving an actual bias, there is a suggestion in Smith that proof 
of an "implied bias" also may be an appropriate basis for relief in "extreme" or 
"exceptional" situations.151 Such situations might include the revelation that a 
- 
143. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215. 
144. Id. at 213-14. 
145. Id. at 214 (quoting Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365,1371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
146. Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980). 
147. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,217 (1982). 
148. Id. at 216. See also United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the trial 
court erred in empanelling a juror whose answers displayed actual bias, resulting in a jury that failed to 
meet Sixth Amendment impartiality requirement). 
149. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217 n.7 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950)). 
150. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) (Breman, J., 
concurring) ("[Tlhe bias of a juror rarely will be admitted by the juror himself, 'partly because the juror 
may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it . . ."'). 
For an illustration of Justice Breman's concern, see Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(relaying the story that sequestered jurors who were almost evenly divided on the defendant's guilt for 
murder committed during a burglary returned a quick verdict of guilty the morning after several jurors' 
rooms had been burglarized, but the jurors claim that the burglaries did not influence their quick 
decision). 
151. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Whether a juror's bias may be implied 
from the circumstances is a question of law for the court, and doubts regarding a juror's bias should be 
resolved against the juror. See Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991). For an 
example of implied bias, see Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (prospective jurors who 
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juror is an employee of the prosecuting agency, is a close relative of one of the 
participants in the trial, or was a witness to or involved in the criminal 
t ran~act ion. '~~ Other extreme situations that might provide the basis for 
imputing bias include a murder-burglary conviction rendered shortly after 
several of the sequestered jurors themselves had been burglarized,153 a guilty 
verdict against a defendant announced in the presence of a jury panel about to try 
the defendant for the same crime,154 a verdict against a defendant for the crime 
of escape rendered shortly after several of the same jurors convicted a co- 
defendant of the same offense,155 a verdict polluted by a shocking display of a 
jury's racial and ethnic bigotry,156 and a murder conviction involving the 
defense of battered-wife s drome where a juror herself had been involved in an 
abusive family situation. 1 F  
A trial court faced with an allegation of juror bias has a duty to carefilly 
investigate the ~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  A court has broad "discretion to determine the extent 
and nature of its inquiry into allegations of juror bias."159 Indeed, the failure to 
conduct a voir dire of the other jurors may be reversible error when a juror's 
highly prejudicial responses may have tainted the other jurors.160 A court has a 
special responsibility to investigate an allegation of racial bias on the part of a 
juror and should conduct an extensive inquiry that includes detailed questioning 
of the person who made the allegation and a thorough questioning of the juror 
who is alleged to have exhibited the bias.16' A court has various options when 
heard the trial judge announce the defendant's guilty verdict in the first trial should be automatically 
disqualified from sitting on a second trial involving similar charges). 
152. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "In those extraordinary situations 
involving implied bias, state-court proceedings resulting in a finding of 'no bias' are by definition 
inadequate to uncover the bias that the law conclusively presumes." Id. (O'Connor, J., concuning). 
153. Hunley, 975 F.2d at 320 ("Our holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein and that 
this case should not be construed as adopting a per se rule that the court presume bias when a juror is 
victimized during trial."). 
154. Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964). 
155. Quintero v. Bell, 256 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2001). 
156. United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (stating that an inquiry conducted 
by the trial judge to dispel proof of actual bias was "superficial at best" for "[ilt is inconceivable that by 
merely denying that they would allow their earlier prejudiced comments to influence their verdict 
deliberations, the jurors could have thus expunged themselves of the pernicious taint of anti-Semitismn). 
Allegation of racial prejudice may constitute extraneous information and, therefore, an exception to the 
rule against allowing jurors to testify to impeach their verdict. See State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 
536 (Minn. 1995). But see Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding post-trial juror 
declarations concerning other jurors' racial bias inadmissible). 
157. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991). 
158. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,215-17 (1982). 
159. United States v. Corbin, 590 F.2d 398, 400 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that the court adequately 
inquired into an allegation that a juror was overheard stating during jury selection that the defendant was 
guilty). 
160. Mach v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bames, 604 F.2d 121, 
143-44 (2d Cir. 1979) (following an allegation that during recess a juror made a physical gesture toward 
defense counsel indicating clear distaste, the court gave the jury a general instruction but properly 
declined to question the individual juror or conduct voir dire of the jury, which might have engendered 
resentment). 
16 1. See United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1 178 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court's voir dire 
of the jury with participation of counsel after two jurors made racially biased comments was a 
reasonable response to a difficult situation); State v. Vamer, 643 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 2002) (finding that 
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faced with an allegation of juror bias. The court must declare a mistrial if it 
concludes that the jury has been tainted,162 may dismiss the offending juror and 
replace the juror with an alternate,163 and, in some 'urisdictions, allow the parties 
to stipulate to a jury of less than twelve persons.16d The judge's handling of the 
matter is reviewed for an abuse of d i ~ c r e t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
F. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL INCOMPETENCE 
A necessary corollary of the right to an impartial jury is the ri ht to a jury in 
which all of its members are physically and mentally competent.'' Proof that a 
juror was mentally impaired, intoxicated, or unconscious would appear to cast 
grave doubt on the integrity of the verdict.167 When such claims are raised 
during the trial, the judge is in a position to correct the problem and pennit the 
trial to ~ 0 n t i n u e . l ~ ~  When such claims are raised after the verdict, attempts to 
take corrective action become much more difficult. As noted earlier, the courts 
are reluctant to allow a post-verdict inquiry into a juror's mental state.'" The 
rule against admitting juror testimony to impeach a verdict is based on several 
policy considerations: the need for finality of the process, the interest in 
encouraging "full and frank discussion in the jury room," the interest in 
encouraging jurors to return an unpopular verdict without fear of community 
resentment, and the interest in inspirin the "community's trust in a system that 
relies on the decisions of laypeople."l' These interests routinely prevent jurors 
-- 
the court committed reversible error by failing to question all jurors about one juror's racial comment to 
the other jurors); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1998) (stating that the court has a special 
responsibility to investigate an allegation of racial bias by jurors). 
162. United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524 (1 lth Cir. 1986). 
163. United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307,337 (5th Cir. 1984); Corbin, 590 F.2d at 400. 
164. United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472-73 (11th Cir. 1996). See FED. R. CRIh4. P. 
23(b) (allowing parties to stipulate to a jury of less than twelve persons at any time prior to verdict and 
holding that court may excuse a juror for cause during deliberations and accept a verdict by the 
remaining eleven jurors). 
165. United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962,967 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (finding abuse of discretion for the 
court's failure to question a juror to determine whether that juror was honest and unprejudiced); United 
States v. Thompson, 744 F.2d 1065, 1068 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding abuse of discretion for failure to 
dismiss a juror who became emotionally upset and equivocated about her ability to remain impartial); 
United States v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding abuse of discretion for failure to 
dismiss a juror who expressed fear of the defendants and whose reluctance to continue to sit, even if 
dismissal required a declaration of mistrial). 
166. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 
(1912). 
167. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (stating that due process requires jurors be sane 
and competent during trial). 
168. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the trial court's removal of a 
dissenting juror during deliberations based on the juror's emotional instability); Lee v. United States, 
454 A.2d 770, 773 (D.C. 1982) (rejecting a motion for mistrial but agreeing to dismiss an intoxicated 
juror or to recess the rial for three days). 
169. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21; McDonald v. 
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915). See also FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (distinguishing between 
inadmissibility of juror testimony relating to internal matters of a juror's mental or emotional state that 
may have influenced the verdict and admissibility of statements relating to extraneous prejudicial 
information or outside influence or pressure brought to bear upon juror). 
170. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21. 
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from giving testimony to invalidate a verdict based on allegations that jurors 
considered prejudicial and irrelevant matters,171 may have engaged in bizarre 
behavior during trial,172 were inattentive during the testimony,173 did not 
understand the judge's instructions, ' 74 or disregarded those instructions. 175 
These policy reasons are often strong enough to overcome post-verdict proof that 
a juror was mentally impaired and to 'ustify a court's refusal to conduct any 
formal investigation into her condition. 136 
The same policy considerations supported the Supreme Court's decision in 
Tanner v. United upholding the trial judge's refusal to conduct an 
investigation into broad allegations that a jury "was on one big p T 7 '  and 
numerous claims alleging jurors' excessive use of alcohol and drugs.' The 
Court rejected the defendant's contention that substance abuse constituted an 
improper external influence.17' According to the Court, "drugs or alcohol 
voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an 'outside influence' than a virus, 
poorly prepared food, or lack of sleep."180 As an internal matter, ingestion of 
drugs and alcohol was within the rule prohibiting juror testimony to upset a 
verdict. 
Whereas some courts and commentators have argued that it should be 
permissible for jurors to have intra-jury discussions about the case during the 
trial,''' it is well-settled that jurors are forbidden to discuss the case before they 
-- - 
171. United States v. Gonzalez, 227 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating information provided by juror 
that during deliberations, several jurors mentioned that it would not matter if they convicted defendant 
because he was charged with white collar crime and would only get a slap on the wrist was inadmissible; 
also inadmissible was jury foreman's alleged statement that defense counsel always represented guilty 
clients). 
172. United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 481 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating juror wrote love letter to 
prosecutor, sent her a picture of himself, and invited her to dinner). 
173. Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1080 (3d Cir. 1985) (relating that juror claimed 
hearing impairment interfered with his ability to understand the evidence); United States v. Pellegrini, 
441 F. Supp. 1367 P.D. Pa. 1977), a r d ,  586 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1978) (claiming that juror did not 
understand the English language). 
174. Davis v. United States, 47 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1931) (rejecting testimony that jurors had not 
heard judge's instructions). 
175. United States v. Martinez-Monoivais, 14 F.3d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting juror's 
claim that other jurors stated that if defendant had not been guilty he would have taken stand); Devoney 
v. State, 717 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1998) (stating testimony by juror that other jurors violated trial court's 
instruction not to consider certain inadmissible evidence cannot be considered as basis for new trial). 
176. United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70,80 (2d Cir. 1974) (suggesting that post-verdict inquiry 
would be allowed if there existed "substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency," as 
shown by an adjudication of insanity or mental impairment closely in advance of trial). But see Sullivan 
v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing and remanding for hearing into juror's alleged 
incompetence iifter sufficient showing was mads that juror suffered fiom mental incompetency during 
trial). 
177. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
178. Id. at 1 15. 
179. Id. at 123. 
180. Id. at 122. 
181. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490,505 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing critics of the 
prohibition). 
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have heard all of the evidence, closing arguments, and the court's le a1 
instructions, and have begun formally deliberating as a collective body. 532 
Judges routinely admonish juries at the outset and throu out the trial to not d discuss the case among themselves prior to deliberations. There are several 
reasons for this admonition. Premature discussions are likely to be unfavorable 
to a defendant, incline jurors who expressed opinions prematurely to adhere to 
those opinions, impair the value of collective decision-making, lack the context 
of the court's legal instructions, prejudice a defendant who may not have had the 
opportunity to present evidence, and benefit the prosecution by reducing the 
burden of proof.184 
Courts recognize a distinction between extra-judicial influences on a jury 
and intra-jury misc~nduct . '~~  External influences completely evade the 
safeguards of the judicial process, whereas internal violations do not raise the 
fear that the jury based its decision on reasons other than the trial evidence.lg6 
Although some courts have a plied a Remmer-like presumption of prejudice to 
extra-judicial misconduct,18? no such presumption applies to internal 
mis~onduct . '~~  Trial judges are afforded very broad discretion to determine the 
method for handling claims of internal misconduct discovered during the trial. 
Courts conducting an inquiry during the trial typically conduct an interview of 
the jurors collectively or individually with the lawyers present,190 or interview 
the jurors outside the presence of counsel.191 However, when an allegation is 
made during the trial that jurors discussed the case, a court's complete failure to 
evaluate the nature of the misconduct or the existence of prejudice ordinarily is 
an abuse of discretion mandating a new 
182. Id.; United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684,688-89 (3d Cir. 1993). 
183. United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264, 1269 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that such 
admonishment is a "critical and important duty and cannot be over-emphasized"). 
184. Resko, 3 F.3d at 689-90. 
185. United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782,796 (5th Cir. 1996). "This circuit has afforded trial courts 
broader discretion in dealing with intrinsic influences due to jury misconduct than it has afforded in 
cases of extrinsic influences . . . because it would hamper the judge's discretion." Id. See also Resko, 3 
F.3d at 690 (stating that ''there is a clear doctrinal distinction between evidence of improper intra-jury 
communications and extra-jury influences"). 
186. Resb ,  3 F.3d at 690. 
187. See supra notes 4 1-49 and accompanying text. 
188. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 796-97; United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954,956-57 (8th Cir. 1996). 
189. Compare United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that a 
decision of a trial judge not to hold a post-trial hearing on a claim of pre-deliberation discussions was 
"clearly within that discretion") with R e s b ,  3 F.3d at 684 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding abuse of discretion for 
failure to a conduct proper inquiry on a claim of premature discussions). For other cases upholding 
convictions despite evidence of premature discussions, see Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 
1988), United States v. Wiesner, 789 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1986), and United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 
974 (5th Cir. 1978). 
190. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 794-96. 
191. United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that a trial court faced 
with a jury tainted from within had broad discretion to interview jurors without the participation of 
counsel because of the "potentially disruptive and coercive effect" of interrogation by attorneys and 
holding that the court may even r e b e  to consult counsel entirely). 
192. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 
394-96 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge for failure to investigate 
allegations of misconduct). 
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By contrast, when an allegation of pre-deliberation discussions by the jury 
is raised for the first time after the verdict, a court may properly refuse to 
conduct any inquiry.193 However, the anti-impeachment rule does not bar juror 
testimony regarding pre-deliberation discussions discovered during the 
Although a court could properly question jurors after the verdict regarding pre- 
deliberation conversations, a court "is virtually automatically justified in 
declining to pursue such an inquiry."195 
Jury nullification is understood as a refusal by a jury to apply the law as 
instructed by the court. Nullification has been condemned as "lawless,"196 an 
"aberrati~n,"'~~ and a "denial of due process."198 AS one court observed, 
[a] jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty7' than 
it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the fact that the former 
cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a 
right out of the power to misapply the law. 199 
The dangers of nullification were described by Judge Simon Sobeloff in an oft- 
quoted statement: 
To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to which 
laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of 
conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long 
survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with 
impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged morally 
untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, as 
appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic.200 
It is commonly recognized that juries have the power to nullify the law, 
although they do not have the right to do so.201 It has thus been the settled rule 
193. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 108 (1987); United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954 
(8th Cir. 1996); State v. Reiner, 731 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio 2000). 
194. Sotelo, 97 F.3d at 797 (holding that an anti-impeachment rule was no bar to juror testimony 
regarding juror discussions discovered during the trial); Resko, 3 F.3d at 684 (finding abuse of discretion 
for failure to conduct a more searching inquiry into juror discussions discovered during trial). 
195. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also Caldwell, 83 
F.3d at 956 (determining the judge properly precluded juror testimony in a post-verdict proceeding 
regarding intra-jury remarks made prior to deliberations, such as "this is just a bunch of crap" and "I've 
heard all of this I need to hear"); Reiner, 731 N.E.2d at 662 (finding no error in the court's refusal to 
conduct an inquiry into allegations of improper jury discussions during trial that were raised for first 
time afier the verdict). 
196. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,494 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
197. United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446,450 (7th Cir. 1983). 
198. Washington, 705 F.2d at 494. 
199. Id. 
200. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969). But see United States v. 
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 11 13, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that "[nullification] permits the jury to bring to bear on the criminal process a sense of 
fairness and particularized justice"); Roscoe Pound, Law in Boob and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 
12, 18 (1910) (arguing that jury nullification is "the greatest corrective of law in its actual 
administration"). 
201. Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920). Justice Holmes stated that "the 
jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." Id. 
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in federal courts and virtually all state courts for over a century that the jury's 
function is to accept the law that is given to it by the court and to apply that law 
to the facts, and that no instruction should be given to a jury that it has the power 
to nullify.202 Counsel's invitation to a j during summation to disregard the 
law is misconduct and subject to contempp3 Jurors who engage in the practice 
may be removed.204 
A trial judge has the power to remove jurors who become incapacitated or 
otherwise become unavailable during the course of  deliberation^.^'^ Whether a 
court has the power to remove a juror who refuses to follow the law has received 
much less attention. However, the few cases that have addressed the question 
emphatically support the judge's power of removal.206 The major difficulty in 
administering this power is being able to conduct an appropriate investigation 
into the allegation of misconduct without jeopardizing the traditional rule of 
secrecy in jury  deliberation^.^'^ 
Since any judicial investigation necessarily requires an intrusion into the 
jurors' mental processes during deliberations, such investigation must be subject 
to extremely stringent The often difficult question is whether the 
juror favors acquittal because she is purposefully disregarding the judge's 
instructions on the law or whether the juror is simply not persuaded by the 
government's evidence.209 The standard for removal that has been adopted by 
202. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895); United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993); State v. Hatori, 990 P.2d 115 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Sanchez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). See People v. 
Engelman, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding it permissible to instruct the jury that it 
must inform the judge if any juror either "refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the 
law or to decide the case based on . . . any . . . improper basis"). Pattern jury instructions advise jurors 
not to question any rule of law stated by the court in its instructions. See United States v. Bruce, 109 
F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1997). By contrast, two states - Indiana and Maryland - have constitutional 
provisions that require judges to advise juries that the legal instructions are only advisory. See 
Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133 n.40. 
203. United States v. Renfroe, 634 F. Supp. 1536,1550 (W.D. Pa. 1986). 
204. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606,608 (2d Cir. 1997). 
205. See FED. R. C m .  P. 23(b) (stating that a judge may excuse a juror during deliberations for just 
cause). Just cause for removal was found in the following cases: United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 
1461,1472 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (recounting a situation when a pregnant juror went into labor); United States 
v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1994) (relating where a juror had to leave for a business trip); United 
States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that a juror learned that his girlfriend had 
been arrested and mistreated by the police); United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 
1991) (stating that a juror was fearful after receiving a threat); United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 
1249 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (stating that a juror became ill). 
206. United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding the trial court's dismissal 
of a deliberating juror who refused to discuss evidence with her fellow jurors, on ground that a juror who 
refuses to deliberate is refusing to perform her duty as a juror); United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 
617 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that a "a juror's purposeful refusal to apply the law as set forth in a jury 
charge constitutes an appropriate basis for that juror's removal"); United States v. G e h d ,  87 F.3d 448, 
450-52 (I lth Cir. 1996) (holding that a juror was properly removed after asserting that her religious 
beliefs led her to conclude that the defendants were victims of governmental entrapment). 
207. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
208. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621 (recognizing "the often difficult distinction between the juror who 
favors acquittal because he is purposefidly disregarding the court's instructions on the law, and the juror 
who is simply unpersuaded by the Government's evidence"). 
209. United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302 (I lth Cir. 2001) (upholding the court's ability to 
dismiss a deliberating juror who is alleged to be willfilly refusing to apply the law if there is no 
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some courts holds that "if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the 
request to discharge stems @om the juror's view of the suflciency of the 
government's evidence, the court must deny the This strict standard 
protects not only against the wrongful discharge of a juror who may be 
deliberating in good faith but also protects against overly intrusive judicial 
inquiries into the substance of jury deliberations. Thus, judges who remove 
jurors precipitously for alleged lawlessness without very good reason abuse their 
discretion and invite reversaL21 
111. WHY JURORS MISBEHAVE? 
Commentary on the U.S. jury typically attempts to explain the nature of the 
jury system, the role of the jury, and the decision-making authority of the 
jury.212 Curiously, despite abundant evidence that jurors misbehave, there has 
been little systematic effort to describe in a comprehensive way the phenomenon 
of jury misconduct, the reasons why jurors misbehave, and the available methods 
to remedy the misconduct. There seems to be little question that some jurors 
violate the rules, either deliberately or inadvertently, although measuring the 
extent of these violations is difficult. Extrapolating from the cases and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that jurors have infected trials by harboring conscious and 
latent biases, engaged in conduct in violation of the trial judge's instructions, 
given dishonest and misleading answers during voir dire, suffered from physical 
and mental impairments, been intoxicated and otherwise inattentive, and flaunted 
the trial court's instructions. Given the policies that seek to preserve jury 
verdicts, there is probably no satisfactory way to entirely eradicate the effects of 
such behavior, particularly after a verdict.213 As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly observed, invalidating a verdict after irresponsible and improper jury 
behavior would undermine the existence of the jury system.214 
"substantial possibility" that the juror is basing his or her "decision on the sufficiency of the evidence"); 
United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding a request that a deliberating 
juror be dismissed may not be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the request is motivated 
by the juror's views on the merits of the case). But see People v. Hightower, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1123, 
1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the trial court's inquiry into allegations of misconduct by a 
deliberating juror may continue beyond the point at which there arises possibility that the request for 
removal stems from his or her view of the sufficiency of the evidence). 
210. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 (quoting United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). See United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988). "That a juror may not be 
removed because he or she disagrees with the other jurors as to the merits of a case requires no citation." 
Hernandez, 862 F.2d at 23. 
21 1. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608-09; People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the 
trial court has authority to remove a juror who expresses unwillingness to follow the judge's instructions, 
but thk trial court abused its discretion by discharging a juror whom other jurors accused of not 
deliberating, but who in reality merely viewed the evidence in a different way). 
2 12. See supra notes 1 1 - 13 and accompanying text. 
213. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (stating that 
"there are no perfect trials"). "To invalidate the result of a 3-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, 
though honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than ow judicial 
system can be expected to give." Id. at 555. 
214. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987); McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. 
at 555. 
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The discussion of juror bias and misconduct in Part I1 provides a foundation 
in the case law to try to synthesize the types of jurors who are most likely to 
engage in improper behavior. These jurors can be classified in the following five 
groups: (1) stealth jurors; (2) activist jurors; (3) impaired jurors; (4) biased 
jurors; and (5) evasive jurors. 
Efforts by criminal defendants to subvert the jury process are not 
unexpected or unusual. One method to engineer an acquittal or a hung jury is to 
surreptitiously approach sitting jurors and offer bribes or make threats to induce 
the juror to acquit the defendant.215 The integrity of the process also can be 
poisoned by the voluntary actions of potential jurors themselves who seek to 
inject themselves into the process for self-serving reasons. For example, recent 
disclosures suggest that some jurors have engaged in improper behavior in order 
to be selected to serve on a jury and then to single-handedly attempt to 
undermine the process.216 A juror who engages in such conduct has been 
described as a "stealth juror," that is, a person who secretly works his or her way 
onto a jury venire in order to poison the jury pool and convict the defendant.217 
Given the extraordinary media frenzy that attends trials of celebrity figures, 
it is not surprising that some people for different reasons might want to be part of 
the judicial process. Indeed, some jurors who have served in recent high-profile 
trials have garnered momentary fame in the aftermath of the verdict. For 
example, the controversial juror in the Martha Stewart trial who gave several 
media interviews after the conviction was accused by Stewart's lawyers of 
misconduct by lying to get on the jury.218 His statements to the media after the 
verdict proclaiming Stewart's conviction as "a victory for the little guy who 
loses money in the markets because of these types of transactions" were used by 
the lawyers for the defendants to argue that the verdict was tainted by this juror's 
alleged agenda to convict.219 Similarly, in the recent Texas murder trial of 
millionaire Robert Durst, a juror appeared on television after the defendant's 
acquittal promoting her book, "Durst Is Not The Worst," in which she describes 
her experience on the jury that acquitted Mr. Durst of a grisly killin a verdict 
2& that many observers contended was a gross miscarriage of justice. Also, in 
215. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (describing efforts by a defendant to bribe 
members of a jury); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (relating a caller's efforts to bribe the 
foreman to acquit the defendant); United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that 
the judge properly dismissed a juror after ascertaining that the juror was in a state of fear resulting kom 
an encounter with unknown men just before the deliberations commenced). 
216. Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, Peterson Prosecutors CaN Any Move to L.A. a Bad Trip, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 1 1,2004, at B2 (describing litigation in the Scott Peterson murder trial). 
217. Joel Cohen, Celebrity Jurors, N.Y.L.J., April 7,2004, at 2 (stating a "'stealth juror' worked her 
way onto jury venire" in the Scott Peterson murder trial); Brian Skoloff, Venue Change Argued; 
PetersonTrial: Prosecution Says Move Pointless, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, May 11, 2004 
(referring to three "stealth jurors" who allegedly lied to get on the Peterson jury). 
218. United States v. Martha Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432,439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
2 19. Id. at 440 n.4. 
220. See Cohen, supra note 2 17. 
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the Tyco trial, a juror made a spectacle of herself by visibly appearing 
throughout the trial to favor the defendants, suggesting that she deliberately 
sought to become a member of the jury for questionable motives.221 
This phenomenon of persons seeking fame and fortune through jury service 
has most recently been alleged in the trial of Scott Peterson, who was accused of 
killing his wife and their unborn son. In requesting a change of venue of the trial 
from Redwood City, California to Los Angeles, Peterson's lawyers contended 
that at least three "stealth jurors" lied to get on the jury in order to convict 
~ e t e r s o n . ~ ~ ~  The lawyers argued that "[bly getting on a nationally famous case . 
. . [these jurors] . . . may have aspirations of working their jury service into a 
book, interviews or some other form of celebrity and possible monetary 
benefit."223 Peterson's lawyers argued that his client's best chance of getting a 
fair trial would be in Los Angeles. However, describing Los Angeles as the 
"entertainment capital of the world," the prosecutor argued in response that 
"[plublicity-hungry jurors eager to sneak their way onto Scott Peterson's jury 
and frenzied media coverage of the case are far more likely to be a problem in 
Los Angeles than in Redwood City . . . . ,3224 
The jury system in several ways encourages jurors to take a much more 
active role in the trial proceedings. Most jurors use their powers responsibly. 
Many jurors, however, have engaged in excessive, extra-judicial conduct that has 
the potential to taint the verdict. Jurors typically are alerted by the trial court that 
they are allowed to use their knowledge and expertise in sifting the evidence and 
deciding on their verdict.225 Moreover, whereas jurors historically were 
prohibited by statute and case law from taking notes during the today 
virtually all courts allow jurors to take notes during the trial.227 Similarly, the 
practice of jurors posing questions to witnesses, although discouraged by many 
courts,228 has been allowed in cases presenting sufficiently complex or 
compelling c i r c ~ m s t a n c e s . ~ ~ ~  
Some jurors, however, bent on solving the case or trying to test the 
evidentiary hypotheses presented to them, may impair the integrity of the 
verdict. These jurors have abused their function by engaging in extra-judicial 
investigations and research, in violation of the trial court's instructions, thereby 
221. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
222. See Skollof, supra note 2 17. 
223. See Walsh & Finz, supra note 216. 
224. Id. 
225. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying tcxt. 
226. Price v. State, 887 S.W.2d 949,951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). 
227. Esaw v. Friedman, 586 A.2d 1164, 1167-68 nn.8-9 (Conn. 1991) (observing "[tlhe federal 
courts are virtually unanimous and our sister states nearly so."). 
228. United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2000); State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 
204,209-12 (Minn. 2002); State v. Gilden, 759 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
229. United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 51 1, 516 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 
101 8 (1 st Cir. 1993); United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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putting themselves in a position to taint the deliberations with extraneous, non- 
evidentiary information. While jurors have the right to use their expertise, jurors 
do not have the right to conduct their own experiments outside the courtroom to 
verify the testimony,230 make unauthorized visits to the places mentioned in 
and engage in extra-judicial research to ascertain the meaning of 
legal concepts or acquire extraneous information relevant to the case.232 
Although reenactments of the evidence are generally allowed, some 
reenactments may be unduly prejudicial and may taint the verdict.233 
Jurors may also engage in activist conduct by deliberately consulting 
outside sources, not to investigate the evidence or to acquire extraneous 
information relevant to the case but to allay any concerns they may have about 
fulfilling their responsibilities as jurors. For example, in one recent capital 
murder trial, deliberating jurors consulted their pastors and, together with their 
families, read several Bible passages relevant to the death penalty, arguably to 
reinforce their decision to execute the defendant, which conduct likely 
diminished their sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty.234 
Indeed, the pastor showed one of the jurors several passages from the Book of 
Numbers that supported capital and stated that he would impose 
the death penalty on the defendant if he were a juror.236 
Finally, 'uror activism is most powerfully illustrated in the debate over juror 
n~llification!~~ Whereas jurors historically had the power to decide questions of 
law,238 today the federal courts and virtually all state courts forbid jurors from 
disregarding the law as given by the trial judge.239 Of course, there are two 
sides to jury nullification. Nullification may be an appealing albeit controversial 
doctrine when used by jurors to promote a higher justice according to their 
conscience. However there is also a "vicious side to jury nullification," as 
exemplified by all-white juries in the South refusing to convict white persons 
charged with murdering blacks.240 
Some jurors are physically or mentally incompetent.241 The presence on a 
230. See supra notes 89- 101 and accompanying text. 
23 1 .  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
234. People v. Danks, 82 P.3d 1249, 1268-79 (Cal. 2004). 
235. Id. at 1268-69. 
236. Id. at 1269. 
237. See discussion supra Part 1I.H. 
238. See ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at 42-45. 
239. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text. 
240. See ABRAMSON, supra note 11, at 61-62. See also Eric Lichtblau & Andrew Jacobs, U.S. 
Reopens '55 Murder Case, Flashpoint of Civil Rights Era, N . Y .  TIMES, May 11,2004, at A1 (describing 
the 1955 acquittal by an all-white jury of two white men charged with lynching a 14-year-old black 
youth; the white defendants later bragged about killing the youth). 
241. See discussion supra Part 1I.F. 
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jury of an incompetent juror violates the defendant's constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.242 Impairment of a juror may be attributable to many causes: a 
juror may have a physical defect, such as a hearing problem;243 a mental defect, 
such as a psychological disorder;244 an emotional problem, such as stress 
resulting from the intensity of the trial experience;245 or an inability to follow the 
proceedings due to consumption of alcohol or drugs.246 
Courts face a sometimes difficult task when an allegation is raised that a 
juror is impaired. When the allegation is raised during the trial, the court has the 
ability to conduct a hearing to determine whether the juror has the physical or 
mental capacity to continue sitting on the jury. When the allegation is raised 
during jury deliberations, the judge is faced with the dilemma of determining 
whether a juror should be dismissed for emotional reasons, particularly when 
that juror may be under stress for being the lone holdout juror seeking to 
maintain her principled position in the face of opposition from the other 
jurors. 247 
When a claim of juror incompetence is raised for the first time after the 
trial, the claim usually is unsuccessfbl, largely based on policy reasons against 
impeaching a jury's verdict.248 Courts are reluctant to probe the minds of jurors 
once they have deliberated and reached a verdict. The well-established "no- 
impeachment" rule makes a distinction between extraneous influences that may 
have affected the jury and internal matters affecting the jury.249 Physical and 
. mental incompetence are regarded as internal matters about which jurors are 
barred from giving testimony.250 Thus, a claim that a juror was suffering from a 
psychological disorder during the trial was regarded as an internal abnormali ? that ordinarily could not provide the basis for challenging the ~erclict .~ ' 
Similarly, a claim that jurors were asleep, intoxicated, and usin drugs during the 
5 5 2  trial was an internal matter about which jurors could not testify. 
In the nineteenth century, jurors who knew about the facts of a case and had 
not expressed or formed opinions about the facts were considered entirely 
242. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1 9 12). 
243. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
246. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,115,122 (1987). 
247. Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1424, 1428 (9th Cir. 1997) (relating how a judge removed 
the lone dissenting juror during stressll deliberations based on the juror's alleged emotional instability). 
248. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
249. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-23. 
250. Id. 
251. See United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1974) (suggesting that the court will 
consider claims only when there exists proof that a juror has been adjudicated to be insane or mentally 
incompetent "closely in advance of the time of jury service"). 
252. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122. 
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proper, indeed attractive, jur0rs.2~~ Today the reverse is the case. 
Commentators suggest that juror ignorance is a virtue and knowledge a vice.254 
As the cases suggest, the problem of juror bias may be one of the most 
intractable issues in the jury system. Clearly, jurors who harbor actual biases 
may not serve, and if the do, the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial 
jury has been violated.2r5 However, demonstrating a juror's bias that is not 
actual, and perhaps may even be unconscious, becomes a much more difficult 
problem. The voir dire process is intended to expose juror biases based on a 
juror's attitudes toward such questions as race, ethnicity, religion, the media, law 
enforcement, the death penalty, and other subjects. 
Researchers have attempted to investigate juror attitudes, juror biases, and 
the effect of juror biases on juror d e c i ~ i o n - m a k i n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Imputing bias and 
partiality to a juror is hazardous. To be sure, instances occur in which jurors 
openly express racist or other discriminatory views, and such expressions are 
usually capable of being remedied?57 In addition, certain instances where jurors 
openly express attitudes that potentially taint the other jurors are capable of 
being investigated and remedied.258 However, given the ambiguities inherent in 
trying to detect latent juror biases, the courts generally restrict the determination 
of implied bias to very extreme situations.259 Courts generally reject claims of 
implied bias. However, courts have recognized that in some instances jurors 
may be exposed to such highly inflammatory circumstances that presuming the 
existence of a bias is reasonable. Such imputed bias has been shown when jurors 
have learned of the defendant's guilt in an earlier trial on the same charges:60 
have been exposed to extremely prejudicial pre-trial publicity:61 have been 
exposed to highly prejudicial events during the have a very close 
relationship with one of the important actors in the case?63 were a victim of the 
crime and are emotionally involved in the case:@ and gave dishonest answers 
on the voir dire to get on the jury.265 
Some jurors may resent the intrusion into their privacy from having to 
253. See ABRAMsoN, supra note 11, at 38-45. 
254. Id. at 49. 
255. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. 
256. See REID HASTIE, INSIDE THE JUROR 46-50 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (providing a generic 
model to study juror bias). 
257. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
261. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724 (1963) (describing how two months prior to trial a TV 
station broadcast three different times a twenty-minute film of the defendant giving a detailed 
confession). 
262. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
263. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 
264. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991). 
265. United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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reveal sensitive matters about their lives and background.266 Other jurors may 
fear for their safety as well as privacy.267 Typical inquiries of prospective jurors 
from the court and counsel relate to the jurors' health; personal income; 
affiliation with civic, social, religious charitable, volunteer, professional or 
business organizations; political party affiliations; interest in particular books, 
newspapers, magazines, or television shows; and whether the juror considers 
himself or herself a liberal, conservative, or moderate.268 A juror who refuses to 
answer such questions because they are embarrassing might be held in 
contempt.269 By the same token, a juror who answers such uestions dishonestly 
$70 or evasively may, if selected, impair the integrity of the trial. 
When a court believes that a jury needs to be protected from possible 
pressures, harassment, and intimidation, a court may empanel a so-called 
anonymous jury.271 Empanelling "an anonymous jury is a drastic measure" that 
implicates a defendant's right to the presumption of innocence.272 Virtually 
every court reviewing the procedure has approved its use where it is genuinely 
needed and properly used.273 One of the problems with empanelling an 
anonymous jury, of course, is the inability of lawyers to detect answers by jurors 
that may be false or evasive, or to uncover any latent juror biases about the case. 
Thus, a juror who may be reluctant to reveal sensitive information about his or 
her personal life may be able to conceal or disguise such information under the 
cloak of anonymity, with the result that hidden, even unconscious, biases may be 
less likely to be detected by the court and the lawyers. 
The controversial juror in the Martha Stewart trial concealed several items 
of personal data that might have been used by the parties to challenge his 
qualifications to be a fair and impartial juror.274 This juror's false and evasive 
responses to a variety of personal and potentially embarrassing questions suggest 
that this juror sought to maintain his privacy and anonymity in the belief that his 
evasions would not be discovered. Although the court found that his failure to 
answer the questions truthfully did not demonstrate an implied bias, his 
misconduct in not giving the lawyers candid responses clearly disabled them 
from making an informed judgment as to whether this juror possessed the 
266. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (relating how a trial court held a 
juror in contempt for refusing to answer many personal questions). 
267. See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988). "Juror's fears of retaliation 
from criminal defendants are not hypothetical; such apprehension has been documented." Id. 
268. See United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1071 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding questions about 
personal habits and activities, including what books jurors read and what television shows they watch, 
"might have aided defendants in identifying sympathetic jurors"). 
269. See Brandborg, 891 F. Supp. at 355 (describing how in response to a juror's refusal to answer 
personal questions the prosecutor stated that her refusal was an insult to the court and "she should do it 
or suffer the cocsequences"). 
270. See discussion supra Part 1I.D. 
271. See United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948,972-73 (9th Cir. 2003). 
272. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (1 1th Cir. 1994). 
273. Shtyock, 342 F.3d at 970-71. "Every circuit that has addressed this issue has held that a lower 
court's decision to empanel an anonymous juy  is entitled to deference and is subject to abuse of 
discretion review." Id. at 970. 
274. United States v. Martha Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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qualifications to be a fair and impartial juror. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The problem of juror misconduct is not an insignificant problem in the 
justice system. Jurors engage in conduct that in different ways deviates from the 
rules of proper juror behavior. Jurors have been influenced by external contacts 
by third parties, engaged in extra-judicial investigations to satisfy their curiosity 
and test the evidence, given false and evasive answers during jury selection, 
engaged in conduct that revealed hidden biases, engaged in pre-deliberation 
discussions about the case, consumed drugs and alcohol and been otherwise 
inattentive to the evidence, and flaunted the trial court's instructions. Jurors who 
engage in misconduct can be categorized as rogue jurors, activist jurors, 
impaired jurors, biased jurors, and evasive jurors. 
Attempts to remedy the problem of juror misconduct have produced mixed 
results. When the misconduct is discovered during the trial, the trial court's 
ability to remedy the problem is greatest. The court can conduct a searching 
investigation to determine whether misconduct was committed and the extent of 
the prejudice. When the misconduct is discovered during deliberations or after 
the trial, strong public policies usually militate against aborting the trial or 
upsettin the verdict. As the courts repeatedly observe, "there are no perfect F 
 trial^."^ As a consequence, however, a verdict of guilt that has been tainted by 
the misconduct of some jurors may be immune from judicial review, with the 
consequence that a criminal defendant may have been denied his constitutional 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
275. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,553 (1984). 
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